


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7 July 1957



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
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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1. SOVIET LEADERS CAST LIGHT ON PURGE

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The precipitating cause of the 29 June purge of Soviet party Presidium members appears to have been a plot to oust Khrushchev and his supporters from the Presidium. From statements made by members of the new Presidium in Leningrad on 6 July, the following picture emerges: The "anti-party group" had been holding secret meetings and had recruited fellow conspirators in an attempt to weight the party and government with their followers. The group "timed its action" to coincide with Leningrad's 250th anniversary celebration beginning on 22 June when most of the top leaders would be in Leningrad. (Khrushchev apologized for the Presidium's failure to appear at that time.) When the question of the visit was discussed in the Presidium, the group apparently refused to go to Leningrad with the rest, thereby tipping its hand.

The central committee was hastily called to meet on 22 June and the whole question of the group's activities was debated. According to a statement Mikoyan made to a US Embassy official, the opposition made a long and stubborn defense of its position. Leningrad poet Prokofyev later reported to a party meeting that the "conduct of these renegades changed before our eyes in the course of the several days of work at the plenum."


Charges made in Leningrad against the purged leaders appear to herald further action against them. Khrushchev accused Malenkov of engineering the "Leningrad Case"--the 1948-49 purging of the Leningrad party organization for which former security chief Abakumov was executed in 1954. Shvernik, referring to the Stalin purges of the late 1930's, denounced the group for tolerating violations of revolutionary law. Meantime, the rising tide of demonstrations and denunciations from below may set the stage for a trial "by popular demand." Moscow TASS reports that some 700,000 Leningrad citizens demonstrated against the purged "Stalinist" leaders.

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2. VISIT OF KHRUSHCHEV AND BULGANIN TO PRAGUE

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Khrushchev and Bulganin, who leave Moscow on 8 July for Prague, probably will discuss with Czech party leaders the problems which have been raised for

the Czechs by the purge in Moscow. At its recent central committee meeting in mid-June, the Czech party reaffirmed its consistent conservative position on Communist interrelationships and internal political questions. It also made clear its intention to resort to repression if necessary to hold the line internally.

After the forthcoming talks, however, Czech party leader Siroky may feel compelled to demote some officials who are tarred with the Stalinist brush, just as was done after the 20th party congress. At that time, only two officials, Defense Minister Cepicka and Minister of Education Stoll, were ousted from their party and government posts, but they were retained as party members. Any more far-reaching shake-up at this time appears unlikely because it might provide additional encouragement to revisionist elements in the party who probably have been cheered considerably by the recent shake-up in Moscow.

The visit of the Russian leaders to Prague is probably the first of a series of such visits which they will make to the Satellites in the next few months. It is probably designed in part to demonstrate that the situation in the Soviet party is under control.

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3. POLISH LEADERS WELCOME SOVIET CHANGES

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Private expressions of opinion by both Polish officials and journalists attending the US embassy party on 4 July in Warsaw indicate a relaxation of the fear of forceful Soviet intervention in Polish affairs and of possible attempts to force a return to hard-line policies. Polish premier Cyrankiewicz termed the news of the Soviet purges "interesting," and observed that better relations between all nations working for peace would now be a prime Soviet aim. Deputy premier Zenon Nowak, who was earlier associated with leading Polish Stalinists, stated that the changes were a good development for everyone. Typical of the Polish managerial class reaction was the statement of the deputy minister of construction that Polish contacts with the West would now be easier. The embassy commented that Gomulka's hand would now be strengthened in dealing with Stalinist elements within his own party.

Polish journalists were even more enthusiastic about the changes, and their articles have described the event as "a grievous blow to our own native conservatives and dogmatists," as aid and support for Polish policies, and as easing Poland's struggle for its own road to socialism. Trybuna Ludu, official party newspaper in an editorial clearly aimed at Polish Stalinists, described the ousted Soviet leaders as a faction steeped in dogmatism, sectarianism and conservatism. Declaring factionalism the greatest danger to any Communist party, it described the Molotov group's post-20th party congress activity as damaging to the Soviet party campaign against revisionism. Another press article has directly warned Polish conservatives to heed the events in the Soviet Union.

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5. BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE REACTION TO SOVIET PURGES

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[Redacted]

The British Foreign Office fears that the recent shake-up in the Soviet hierarchy may promote a dangerous mood of relaxation in the Western alliance, but expects no essential changes in Soviet foreign or domestic policies.

London sees the personnel changes in the Presidium as the culmination of long-standing policy disagreements on many subjects, and suggests that Khrushchev may have wished to eliminate his opponents partly in order to press forward with his far-reaching reorganization and other major plans. Since Khrushchev will no longer be checked by opposition, the Foreign Office believes Soviet foreign policy is likely to be "more clever, more enterprising, more elastic, and more insidious" than ever.

The Foreign Office strongly disagrees with the view of its embassy in Moscow that the Soviet government will be weakened and command less popular support. London officials suggest, however, that Khrushchev may have promoted Zhukov to full membership in the Presidium partly to lend prestige to the new version of collective leadership.

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6. DISSIDENT EAST INDONESIAN COMMANDER ASSERTS SUPREMACY

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[Redacted]

Lt. Col. Sumual, deposed commander in East Indonesia, on 7 July declared himself still the supreme military authority in that territory, according to a press report from Djakarta. His announcement noted that his decision was based on the demand of the "entire population of East Indonesia," and that troops there "still obey me." His headquarters has been transferred from Makassar, in southern Celebes, to Menado in the north.

This outright defiance apparently nullifies Djakarta's recent efforts, led by army chief of staff General Nasution, to end Sumual's revolt against the central government's authority. Nasution only last week returned from Makassar with optimistic statements on negotiations for an amicable settlement in East Indonesia. Sumual's statement also brings to an end some weeks of confusion regarding his status, during which his actions at times suggested some acquiescence to the demands of Djakarta.

The northern Celebes area, which recently declared itself a separate province under Sumual's aegis and announced its economic independence, is a stronghold of support for Sumual. The establishment of his command in Menado is additional confirmation that this region has become the principal area of dissidence in East Indonesia.

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7. KOREANS IN JAPAN REPORTEDLY PLAN ACTION AGAINST US EMBASSY

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
The pro-North Korean General Federation of Koreans Residing in Japan is planning an action against the American embassy in Tokyo on 10 July, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] They plan
a protest against the decision of the United States to modernize
the equipment of the forces in South Korea. [REDACTED]

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Comment [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The Koreans in Japan are more prone to violence than the Japanese. They have often been used by the Japan Communist Party to spearhead violent action, and participated in the Communist-instigated disorders of 1952.

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
8. ARGENTINA "INTERRUPTS" RELATIONS WITH VENEZUELA OVER PERON ASYLUM

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The Argentine foreign minister announced on 7 July that Argentina had "interrupted" its relations with Venezuela. Argentina acted after it had demanded that Venezuela deport ex-dictator Peron or move him into the interior of Venezuela. In response, Venezuela had recalled its top embassy officials in Buenos Aires on 5 July, and on 6 July declared the Argentine ambassador in Caracas persona non grata.

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Argentine concern over Peronista activities throughout South America is especially acute at this time in view of reports that the "Peronista Command" and Argentine Communist elements plan violence just prior to the scheduled 28 July constituent assembly elections. Argentina has successfully persuaded most neighboring countries to restrict Peronista activities but Venezuela has thus far refused to acknowledge that Peron's presence there is a serious threat to the Aramburu regime.

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The Argentine foreign minister has admitted that a break with Venezuela [redacted] might also create an unfavorable atmosphere for convocation of the 15 August inter-American economic conference in Buenos Aires. [redacted]

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